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I built a new dataset on Islamist attack plots and plotters in the West between 1990 and 2010, entitled the "Jihadi Plots in the West (JPW) Dataset." I started in 1990 because jihadi attacks in the West were rare before that time. I could not use established terrorism datasets (ITERATE, RAND/MIPT, and GTD) to estimate recruit supply, because they exclude foiled attacks and lack information on plot participants. More detailed incident overviews exist, but none covers the entire West for both the 1990s and 2000s. To construct the JPW Dataset, I collated incident data from existing overviews by other scholars: Nesser (2008a; for Europe; Benjamin and Simon (2002) , Jenkins (2010) , and Bjelopera and Randol (2010) for the United States; Mullins (2011) for Australia; and Egerton and Wilner (2009) for Canada. 3 These overviews are well referenced and rarely disputed. Underreporting is conceivable, but unlikely; government concealment of foiled plots presumably only concerns a limited number of small conspiracies. Western governments gain from informing their publics about thwarted attacks, because it demonstrates competence and deters future attackers. Overreporting is a more serious concern, because the lists include a variety of incident types and require some sifting to identify confirmed domestic jihadi plots-those that (1) involved violence, (2) were intended for Western soil, (3) involved Islamists, and (4) were reasonably well documented. Jenkins (2010) and Bjelopera and Randol (2010) include cases 3 These overviews were chosen for their thick plot description and inclusion of bibliographic references. Alternative overviews tend to include fewer details and references; see, e.g., Schanzer et al. (2010) , Bakker (2011) , <AU: Bakke 2011 meant here? No, BakkeR (see note below) > Beutel (2011 ), Dahl (2011 , Egerton (2011) , Kurzman (2011) , and New America Foundation (2011). Sageman's (2010) dataset is not public. Mueller and Stewart's (2012) overview of U.S. plots is detailed, but appeared too late for inclusion in this study. Although these incident lists may include somewhat more or fewer cases than those used for the JPW dataset, the differences are not substantial. 8 may be minor reporting biases stemming from variation in prosecution practices or media reporting constraints between countries. It could also be that the compilers of these overviews were unequally meticulous. All these problems notwithstanding, the dataset arguably represents our best estimate yet of the population of intended attacks in the West between 1990 and 2010.
Having identified the plots, I moved to the plotters, seeking to establish the number and identity of core participants. I placed the bar of inclusion fairly high, to include only people who were directly involved in operational matters. In most cases, core plotters were easy to identify, but in some instances identification required a subjective assessment based on poor or conflicting evidence. 6 There may be some overreporting, because some cases involved many initial arrests and no follow-up information about the participants' roles, forcing me to include all initial detainees. Individuals were only counted once; in the few cases where the same network perpetrated more than one attack (such as the GIA bombings in
France in the late 1990s), attack number 2 and up were coded as having no perpetrators.
I then gathered biographical information on each plotter, seeking to establish whether they had previously fought abroad. This information enabled me to distinguish the "fresh" domestic fighter supply from the foreign-turned-domestic fighters. To obtain this information I relied on the earlier mentioned incident overviews, as well as these search engines: LexisNexis, World News Connection, and Google. Past foreign fighter experience is likely to be underreported, especially for participants in the less well-documented European plots. This 9 means that the "fresh" domestic fighter supply may be somewhat lower than my estimate suggests.
Finally, I collected evidence on declared intentions, using the same types of open sources. First, for the foreign-turned-domestic fighters, I looked for the declared purpose of the initial trip abroad, coding three types of motivations: to fight abroad, to train abroad for a domestic attack, or unknown. Second, for other domestic fighters, I looked for evidence indicating whether they had expressed a desire to travel abroad as foreign fighters before engaging in the domestic attack. These data become relevant later when I try to explain the relative distribution of domestic and foreign fighters.
Overall, I count 401 plotters, of whom at least 107 were previously foreign fighters.
Thus 294-or let us say roughly 300-is my best estimate for the aggregate fresh supply of domestic fighters (see Table 1 ). This represents the estimated total number of Islamists in the West who, in the period between 1990 and 2010, were prepared to proceed directly to domestic attacks without going abroad first.
--- Table 1 about here ---These estimates are, of course, tentative and should be read as indicators of order of magnitude, not precise measurements.
COUNTING FOREIGN FIGHTERS
This section explains how I estimated the supply of foreign fighters for the same period. This is a tricky task, because reliable data are elusive. I concur with Egerton (2011: 119-20 ) that precise quantification is impossible, but I propose a way to generate rough estimates for comparative purposes.
Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 in Hafez (2007) . Note that Iraq is by far the best documented foreign fighter destination; for other conflicts, data are much patchier.
9 European countries appear to have prosecuted foreign fighting less aggressively than the United States, and no Western government tracked foreign fighters systematically as a group before 9/11 (Kaplan 2002) .
Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 12 former foreign fighters (e.g., Collins 2002; Nasiri 2006) . Finally I gathered news reports from Lexis-Nexis with relevant search terms ("<destination country> AND 'foreign fighters,'" "<destination country> AND 'foreign volunteers,'" "<Source country> AND 'foreign fighters,'" "<source country> AND volunteers AND jihad"). I then skimmed all the material, recording every reference to foreign fighter movements that (1) contained a specific number and (2) clearly referred to Western-origin volunteers. This generated a list of 55 observations.
Most are in the form of statements by Western intelligence officials, Islamists, journalists, or academics. Veteran foreign fighters from the JPW dataset were not included as observations. I sorted the observations by departure region and put them in rough chronological order. The data were not processed or coded any further due to their heterogeneous nature. Instead I used them to subjectively generate rough estimates.
This approach is fraught with problems. For one, the observation set is undoubtedly incomplete, because I cannot claim to have exhausted the literature. Second, individual observations are highly unreliable, because many actors have an interest or inclination to inflate or deflate numbers. Third, there are reporting biases, with some conflicts and some periods better covered than others. Fourth, there is unit heterogeneity: Some observations contain just a few names, others offer snapshot estimates from a single point in time and space, whereas yet others constitute aggregate estimates covering several years and conflicts.
Still, as argued later, these are the least bad data available, and they provide our only way of getting at least a rough sense of the scale of the foreign fighter phenomenon.
To avoid confirmation bias in favor of the argument I propose, I extracted only a very conservative estimate from the 55 observations. The subjective estimation process can be summarized as follows (see also Table 2 ):
• For the United States in the 1990s, an FBI official speaks of 1,000-2,000 American foreign fighters (observation #2), a journalist refers to three dozen named individuals Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 Accepted, copyedited, pre-typeset version 
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(observation #3), and two academics speak of "hundreds if not thousands" (observation #4). There are additional reports of small groups in Bosnia and elsewhere (observations #5-15). Let me be very conservative and say 100.
• For the United States in the 2000s, reports indicate "at least 20" in Somalia (observation #19) and a few people in Yemen (observation #20). In addition, Jenkins and Bjelopera and Randol together report 82 named individuals (observations #17 and #18).
10 A conservative estimate is therefore 100.
• For Europe in the 1990s, there is an outlier report of 1,000-2,000 from the whole continent (observation #25) and another of "several hundred" (observation #26), whereas observation #27 speaks of "several hundred" Europeans in Bosnia alone. In addition there are country-specific reports, for example, 400 French in Afghanistan (observation #24) and 50 French in Bosnia (observation #31). A conservative estimate is thus 200.
• For Europe in the 2000s, observations #36-52 converge on at least 100 for Iraq, at least 200 for Afghanistan/Pakistan, at least 10 in Yemen, and at least 150 in Somalia.
A rough conservative estimate is thus 500.
• For Australia, we have two observations from the 2000s: the 14 named individuals (observation #53) and a report of 10-40 Australians in Somalia in the 2000s (observation #54). Let us use an estimate of 25.
• For Canada, we have only one observation (#55) of approximately 20 people in Somalia in the 2000s. Let us say 20. Supply rates almost certainly vary over time and between countries. Unfortunately, the data are too patchy to allow for detailed (country-year) disaggregation, but we can do it by decade and continent (excluding Canada and Australia for a lack of data). Of course, disaggregating already tentative estimates is problematic, but the rough proportions of the variation are noteworthy (see Table 3 ).
---
Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 --- Western jihadists first considered using violence, they were, all else equal, more likely to join a distant war zone than attack at home.
EXPLAINING THE DISTRIBUTION
This section considers three candidate explanations for why foreign fighting has proved the more frequent choice of Western jihadists: (1) because it is easier, 2) because they need training, and (3) because they prefer it.
Opportunity
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The first hypothesis suggests that militants go where it is easier to operate. It may be that choices are informed by domestic constraints (i.e., that the preemptive capability of Western security agencies on home turf is so high that Western jihadists go abroad instead). This hypothesis rests on the underlying assumption that the individual does not care much where he engages.
To probe the plausibility of this hypothesis, we can ask whether it makes sense to argue that it is much easier for a Western jihadist to operate abroad than at home. Much suggests that it does not. Planning an attack in the West is risky, but so is foreign fighting; it involves crossing international borders, navigating unfamiliar territory, dodging heavyhanded local police, and dealing with unknown new contacts. There is a considerable risk of being arrested, tortured, wounded, or killed in the search for access to a conflict zone.
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Although domestic counterterrorism measures have proliferated post-9/11, the same is true at the international level. States share more intelligence and cooperate more on counterterrorism.
International travel is better monitored and ID papers harder to forge. Western states take more direct action, in the form of espionage, special operations, drone attacks, and the like, to dismantle jihadi networks in the Muslim world. One might even argue that domestic fighting can be easier than foreign fighting, because there is anecdotal evidence of jihadists who attacked at home after finding foreign fighting impractical.
The picture changes if we assume that jihadists care about the duration of the fighting experience. A key difference between domestic and foreign fighting is that in the West, attackers rarely get more than "one shot" before being killed or arrested, whereas they can fight longer if they reach a conflict zone. There is anecdotal evidence of a "Hemingway 11 No data exist on foreign fighter death rates. Anecdotal evidence (Hegghammer 2011:63) suggests they can vary from under 5% (1980s Afghanistan) to more than 90% (late 1990s Chechnya).
Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 effect" associated with foreign fighting; that is, some recruits are motivated by the search for adventure (Sageman 2004) . For these individuals, duration presumably matters more, making opportunity a major factor informing theirtheater choice. However, we do not know the proportion of foreign fighters for whom this is the case, because adventurism is not a motivation that activists usually declare.
Another indication that countermeasures matter is the chronological evolution of the foreign fighter-domestic fighter ratio. The opportunity hypothesis implies that the relative prevalence of foreign fighting is correlated with the level of constraints on domestic fighting relative to that on foreign fighting. It is reasonable to assume that, after 9/11, international counterterrorism improved relatively more than domestic counterterrorism because the improvement potential was larger. We should thus expect to see the relative popularity of foreign fighting decline after 9/11, which is exactly what we did see. However, higher constraints on foreign fighting are likely not the whole story; shifting preferences may also have something to do with the ratio change.
In sum, physical obstruction may account for some of the variance in theater choices, but it is likely not the most important factor.
Training
A second hypothesis is that recruits prefer operating in the West, but train abroad first to increase capability. Here, foreign fighting is an instrumental strategy in which militants forsake short-term tactical opportunities for the deferred gratification of a more destructive operation in the future. This view is common among analysts and policy makers today, and it
Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 underpins the widespread assumption that foreign fighters are domestic terrorists in the making.
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It is true that good fighting skills require physical practice and that military know-how is more widely available in the conflict zones of the Muslim world than in the West.
Moreover, the data presented later in this article suggest that foreign fighters really do make more lethal domestic operatives. However, does it make sense to argue that training abroad is necessary for a domestic operation? Probably not. For one, a domestic attack need not be very destructive or complicated, as al-Qaida itself has told its followers (see the later discussion). A second indicator is the foreign fighters' declared initial intentions for going abroad.
In the biographies of the 107 foreign-fighters-turned-domestic-fighters in the JPW datasetthe subset of foreign fighters most likely to have intended to eventually return-I found only 2 individuals who explicitly stated they went abroad to train for a future domestic attack. The likelihood of underreporting prevents us from making too much of this observation, but it is worth noting, especially in light of the fact that the same sample contains 45 cases of individuals declaring that the initial purpose of the trip was to join a foreign insurgency (see Table 4 ). Table 4 What about militants? The proposition that Western jihadists heed norms when deciding where to fight can be assessed by looking at declared motivations and motivation sequencing. If most foreign fighters say they intend to join insurgencies abroad and most militants acquire the motivation to fight abroad before the motivation to attack at home, then the norms hypothesis is strengthened.
---
Measuring declared intentions is, of course, problematic. We often lack reports of intentions, and when we do have them, there is no guarantee that the source is being truthful.
That said, it would be unreasonable to dismiss declared intentions as completely irrelevant. As far as motivation sequencing is concerned, we already know that it is more common to fight abroad before fighting at home than the other way around, and that very few Iraq, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Somalia (Farwell 2010; Finsnes 2010; Salem, Reid, and Chen 2008) . This suggests that in the early radicalization phase, recruits are exposed to more propaganda about foreign conflicts than about domestic operations. It also indicates that propagandists expect new recruits to be more sensitive to imagery from established war zones than to examples of operations in the West. The norms hypothesis also plausibly accounts for at least some of the decrease in the foreign-to-domestic fighter ratio (from 11:1 in the 1990s to 3:1 in the 2000s). We know that the normative consensus against attacks in the West weakened in the Islamist community from the late 1990s onward (Gerges 2006) . In the early 1990s, virtually no Islamist figure publicly articulated arguments for attacks in the West. It was not until 1998 that al-Qaida
Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 published the first in a series of statements advocating attacks on Western civilians worldwide (Lawrence 2005 Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 Accepted, copyedited, pre-typeset version 
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Even though most foreign fighters appear not to leave with the intention of returning for domestic attacks, some clearly do acquire this motivation along the way. This section looks at how many they are, why they return, and how they affect violence in the West.
Return Rates
My data, with all its limitations, indicate that no more than one in nine foreign fighters returned to perpetrate attacks in the West (107 returnees against 945 foreign fighters). The return rate may well be even lower, because the foreign fighter estimate has a larger upside than that of returnees. On the one hand, this rate suggests that far from all foreign fighters are domestic fighters-in-the-making. On the other hand, a one-in-nine radicalization rate would make foreign fighter experience one of the strongest predictors of individual involvement in domestic operations that we know. The predictive power of other biographic variableswhether nationality, economic status, or any other biographical trait studied so far-does not come close (Bakker 2006; 2009; Egerton 2011; Sageman 2004; Venhaus 2010) .
Unfortunately, however, the question of differential radicalization-why only some foreign fighters become domestic fighters-cannot yet be answered for lack of data.
Radicalization Processes and Mechanisms
Why would any foreign fighter return for an attack if he originally decided it was preferable to leave? A full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this study, but I sketch out two hypotheses for further testing. These hypothetical processes were generated inductively from observation of known cases of foreign fighters "going domestic." There may be additional processes, but the two I propose seem to be more common.
The first, called "enlistment," refers to a trajectory in which the foreign fighter is drawn into domestic fighting by a calculating second party. His own initial intention was to Dette er en postprint-versjon / This is a postprint version. DOI til publisert versjon / DOI to published version: 10.1017/S0003055412000615 join a foreign insurgency, but he finds himself in a training camp operated by a group with plans to attack in the West. The recruit may or may not be aware of the group's international ambitions when joining. Over time he develops a sense of loyalty to the leadership and makes friends with fellow trainees. At some point he is asked about his general willingness to serve the organization by participating in an operation, the details of which may or may not be known to him. Peer pressure, a sense of loyalty, and/or a lack of exit options make him accept. When the order to deploy to the West arrives, he is so deeply invested in the organization and has so few ways out that he complies, even if the operation is of a type that he originally considered illegitimate.
There are numerous examples of this process, the most famous being the so-called Hamburg Cell of the 9/11 plot, whose members went to Afghanistan with the intention to train for jihad in Chechnya naïve. Having participated in insurgency, he comes to view domestic fighting as just a small and permissible escalation. He decides to return, inclined to operate in the West, but without a specific plot in mind.
One example of this pattern is provided by the so-called Chechen Network, which plotted attacks on the Russian embassy in Paris in 2002, having previously trained in Chechnya but without having forged ties with a particular organization (Nesser 2011b: 274ff) .
The same appears to have been the case with the Frankfurt cell, which plotted an attack on the Strasbourg Christmas market in 2000, after training in Afghanistan (Nesser 2011b: 223ff) .
More recently, the "Stockholm bomber" Taimour Abdelwahhab trained in Iraq before perpetrating a botched suicide operation in late 2010, apparently on his own initiative (Reuters 2011 ).
The precise mechanisms by which individuals come to defy normative constraints on terrorism in these two processes remain to be identified. One possible mechanism is continued exposure to selective information about clerical views on terrorist tactics. In the field, the foreign fighter is surrounded exclusively by fellow militants. Moreover, he is exposed to a narrow range of clerical opinion on violence, because such opinions only reach him through the host organization's own ideologues, literature selected by the host organization, or fellow recruits. This is in contrast to the home setting, where he is exposed to a broader range of opinion, for example in the local mosque or among family and friends. Moderate voices might not convince him that domestic attacks are categorically forbidden, but they introduce uncertainty about the validity of legal claims made by radical ideologues.
Both of these hypothetical radicalization processes require further testing through process tracing. All we know for now is that some foreign fighters acquire the motivation to attack in the West after going abroad.
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Impact
The JPW data suggest that the presence of foreign fighter returnees increases the effectiveness of attacks in the West(see Table 5 ). Whereas only 26% of all plotters are known to have foreign fighter experience, around 46% of all plots (49 of 106) included at least one veteran.
For executed attacks, the rate is 58% (14 of 24), and for executed attacks with fatalities, it is 67% (8 of 12). Twenty-nine percent of plots with veterans reached execution and 16% caused fatalities. For plots without veterans the corresponding rates are 18% and 7%. Here again, precise figures must be taken with a pinch of salt given the data problems, but the available numbers tentatively suggest that the presence of a veteran increases-by a factor of around 1.5-the probability that a plot will come to execution, and it doubles the likelihood that the plot will kill people. Table 5 about My tentative data thus corroborate existing evidence of a "veteran effect" that makes returnees more lethal operatives. It is important, however, not to select on the dependent variable and infer that outgoing foreign fighters are more dangerous as a group, because as we know, most foreign fighters do not return for domestic attacks.
---

PROBING DIFFERENTIAL CHOICE
As noted in the introduction, the lack of demographics on the foreign fighter population precludes systematic investigation into the determinants of differential choice: why some stay while others leave. Nevertheless, in this section I cautiously probe this question, using available information and building on insights from the preceding analysis. The probe also serves to shed light on the limits of the norms hypothesis. Such limits clearly exist, because no less than 294 of 401 individuals in the JPW dataset attacked at home apparently without going abroad first.
For the sake of simplicity, I assume that the norms hypothesis is correct and that, all else equal, all first-time militants will prefer going abroad. Foreign fighting is thus the default choice, and variation stems from the unknown set of factors that make some first-time militants choose domestic attacks.
Because we cannot know whether a particular biographical characteristic-be it ethnicity, education level, or something else-predisposes agents to choose one or the other theater, our only hope is to identify process-based "treatments" correlated with specific choices. In the following, I discuss two such treatments: (1) personal contact with a foreign fighter veteran and (2) obstruction. I identified these two treatments inductively from the biographies of individuals in the JPW dataset who went straight to domestic fighting. I argue that these two factors, together with the norms hypothesis, plausibly account for a majority of choices. However, a residual category of unexplained decisions remains.
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The most common factor appears to be veteran influence. For the reasons discussed in the previous section, veteran foreign fighters are more likely than nonveterans to view domestic operations as legitimate. They are familiar with the arguments used to counter violence-constraining legal claims, and their combat experience gives them authority and credibility among nonveterans. 16 where government informants were involved in more than one-third of terrorism investigations (Kurzman, Schanzer, and Moosa 2011: 469) and in 62% of the prosecutions in the top 50 terrorism cases (Greenberg 2010: 20) . 17 In 28% of trials involving informants, the defendant claimed entrapment (Greenberg 2010: 20) . This occurred in several cases in the JPW dataset, most famously in the Fort Dix, Riverdale Synagogue, and Herald Square cases.
So far U.S. courts have dismissed all such claims, so we cannot say that entrapment in the 16 A new member of a jihadi network in France described the influence of veterans as follows:
"Among my new brothers, there was a hierarchy based on one's involvement in the Muslim cause. Those who had done great and beautiful things were our leaders. We admired them; for us they were heroes" (Guendouz 2002: 110) .
legal sense has occurred. However, anecdotal evidence from several cases suggests that informants offered suggestions or subtle encouragement for an attack and in some cases provided weapons (CHRGJ 2011; Greenberg 2011 (CHRGJ 2011: 48) . The politicization of the entrapment debate and the lack of good data prohibit firm conclusions, but it is possible that agents provocateurs can play a role similar to that of veterans, by helping persuade otherwise hesitant subjects to act.
A second, less frequent mechanism may be obstruction. As mentioned earlier, at least 13 plot participants said they initially wanted to go abroad as foreign fighters, but found it difficult to do so and thus decided to act at home instead. This was notably the case with the Somali Australians in "Operation Neath" in 2009 (Munro 2010) . There are many conceivable obstructing factors, including a lack of money or a passport, lack of contacts at relevant destinations, and a sense of being watched by the authorities. Obstruction helps individuals overcome normative concerns because it allows them to blame their involvement in the less legitimate violent activity on circumstance.
In the end, however, veteran influence and obstruction cannot account for all cases of people proceeding straight to domestic attacks. There is a non-negligible residual category of first-time militants who attack at home without knowing a veteran and without having been visibly obstructed. This residual category presumably comprises people making choices informed by unknown biographical or contextual factors. Until we obtain substantially better biographical data, the puzzle of differential choice unfortunately has to remain unsolved.
CONCLUSION
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Western jihadists may not all be equally motivated to attack in the West. In fact, the tentative data presented here indicate that most prefer to fight outside the West and that most foreign fighters do not "come home to roost." However, the data also point to a veteran effect that makes returnees significantly more effective operatives. (Cooley 1973: 184-91; Karmon 2005) before returning to domestic operations. For the most part, however, inter-theater mobility of this kind has been unusual. I anticipate at least two objections to my analysis. Some will argue that the data are too unreliable to support my conclusions. Many aspects of the coding of the JPW dataset can be discussed, and the basis for the foreign fighter estimates is very weak by the standards of modern social science. In response, I argue that good data on jihadism are notoriously difficult to obtain and that this study was a modest and transparent attempt to make the most of the available sources. Partial data are not always better than no data at all, but in this particular case they are, because policies are already being informed by empirically unfounded assumptions about the threat posed by foreign fighters.
A second valid objection is that that the category "foreign fighter" itself is overaggregated. For example, there is a difference between fighting in one's country of origin (e.g., Somali Americans going to Somalia) and fighting in a third country (e.g., Somali
Americans going to Afghanistan). There is also a difference between fighting one's host country (e.g., U.S. citizens fighting U.S. soldiers in Iraq) and fighting a third country (e.g., U.S. citizens fighting Indian soldiers in Kashmir). Finally there is the difference between leaving to train with international terrorists and leaving to fight with local insurgents. These distinctions are significant, but their exploration exceeded the scope of the article.
Indeed, the article has identified several questions for further research. Why do some militants proceed straight to domestic fighting without the "treatment" of foreign travel or My findings have several policy implications. First, to accurately measure domestic terrorist activity, analysts should distinguish more systematically between violence at home and abroad and consider abandoning the fuzzy term "homegrown terrorism." Second, policy makers should distinguish between outgoing and returning foreign fighters and treat the latter as more of a threat. Prosecuting all aspiring foreign fighters as prospective domestic terrorists has limited preventive benefits, because so few of them, statistically speaking, will go on to attack the homeland. By the same logic, the use of agents provocateurs to draw aspiring foreign fighters into fake domestic plots may have limited preventive value. By contrast, returning foreign fighters and their contacts should be monitored very carefully. Third, governments should adapt their communication strategies to the reality that most Islamists consider confined insurgency more legitimate than international terrorism. Talk of insurgents and foreign fighters as "terrorists" will likely fall on deaf ears and may irritate rather than dissuade the fence-sitters. It is probably better to acknowledge the difference between domestic and foreign fighting and to discourage each activity with different sets of arguments.
For the social sciences more broadly, the article has illustrated the value of disaggregating phenomena that appear to be ideologically connected. The argument itself is not new; Kalyvas (2003) highlighted the problem of overaggregated variables in the study of civil war. Still, the view that radical Islamists are all the same has proved remarkably resilient.
I hope that this article will help question that assumption.
